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Discussion of “Housing and the Labor Market: Time to Move and Aggregate 
Unemployment” by Peter Rupert and Etienne Wasmer 
Michael W. L. Elsby 
University of Edinburgh and NBER 
The motivation of this paper is to try to understand how geographical mobility interacts with the 
determination of unemployment. This is an important and relatively understudied question. It 
seems intuitive that part of the frictions that shape the equilibrium level of joblessness in modern 
economies must be those that limit the mobility of workers across space.  
Peter Rupert and Etienne Wasmer have devised a novel approach to this question: They view the 
problem as one of search over commuting distance. A distinctive virtue of their approach is its 
simplicity and parsimony, an advantage not shared by alternative leading models of geographical 
mobility. And the result the authors converge on is an intuitive one: Mobility frictions reduce 
mobility and raise equilibrium unemployment.  
In what follows, I focus on three main reactions to the paper. The first relates to the role of 
Rupert and Wasmer’s assumption of isotropy—that space looks identical viewed from any 
location. Such an assumption can appear strong at first blush, as the authors note themselves. In 
addition, further reflection also would suggest that this assumption may play an important role in 
the model’s main result—that mobility frictions raise unemployment.  
To see how, it is useful to think through the logic of this result. As I understand it, higher 
mobility frictions in the model (parameterized by a reduction in the arrival rate of housing offers, 
  ) imply that workers will find it harder to move once they are employed. Knowing this, 
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unemployed workers become choosier about their commute distance, and consequently 
unemployment rises. 
Thus, unemployment rises in Rupert and Wasmer’s model because mobility frictions reduce the 
value of employment to workers relative to the value of unemployment. A priori, it wasn’t 
obvious to me that this result would hold: Shouldn’t mobility frictions reduce the value of 
unemployment as well as the value of employment, since unemployed workers also forgo the 
ability to move? The answer is that the unemployed have no reason to move in Rupert and 
Wasmer’s model, since space is isotropic!  
The latter highlights the importance of isotropy in generating the link between mobility frictions 
and unemployment in the model. If the value of unemployment were to decline symmetrically 
with the value of employment as mobility frictions rise, it would seem that the latter frictions 
should be neutral with respect to equilibrium unemployment. 
My second reaction is motivated by a comparison of Rupert and Wasmer’s model with 
alternative models of geographical mobility. As the authors note, two strong assumptions in the 
model are that there is an exogenous wage, and that frictions to mobility are shaped by an 
exogenous housing offer arrival rate   . These run counter to a key lesson from the literature on 
migration that mobility acts as a form of spatial arbitrage, i.e. migration responds endogenously 
to both spatial wage disparities and to migration costs (see e.g. Kennan and Walker, 2011). 
It is natural to ask, then, what is missed by abstracting from these aspects of the mobility 
decision? To get a sense for this, it is helpful to think through the implications of the toy model 
illustrated in the panels of Figure 1.  
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To begin with, assume there are two locations, 1 and 2, and that there are no frictions to the 
mobility of labor. In this environment, it is well-known that equilibrium can be illustrated as in 
Panel A. Frictionless mobility implies that the marginal product of labor in market 2 is the 
opportunity cost of labor in market 1 (and vice versa). Consequently, the labor demand curve in 
market 2 acts as the supply curve of labor to market 1. In equilibrium, there is a law of one wage, 
equal to   , and there is no unemployment.  
Now imagine the economy faces a shock, for example that the demand for labor in market 1 
declines. Panel B illustrates the outcome in a frictionless economy: Wages fall in both locations 
to   , and the law of one wage is upheld by migration of workers from location 1 to location 2. 
There remains no unemployment. 
We can now consider the effects of costly mobility across locations in this model. To make 
matters as stark as possible, imagine that it is infinitely costly to move location. Panel C depicts 
outcomes in this world: Since workers cannot migrate to arbitrage wages, wage differentials 
emerge in equilibrium. However, even in this case, there is no unemployment; workers remain 
employed in their original location. 
The final panel of Figure 1 highlights an interesting result: that an interaction between mobility 
frictions and institutions can arise in this environment. Panel D considers the case in which 
mobility is impossible and there exists an unemployment benefit equal to  . In this case, spatial 
wage disparities persist (though are lessened), and unemployment arises in equilibrium. An 
interesting (and arguably realistic) implication is that unemployment can be viewed 
simultaneously as both voluntary and involuntary: Confronted with a job offer in location 1, the 
unemployed are indifferent on the margin. A job offer from location 2, however, would be a 
strict improvement for the unemployed. 
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The simple model in Figure 1 yields a number of useful lessons. The first is that, once one allows 
for endogenous migration, it can be seen that mobility is the outcome of reallocational shocks 
across space. Second, we see that migration and wage outcomes are intertwined in equilibrium: 
Mobility both responds to and determines wages. The law of one wage in Panels A and B of 
Figure 1 is upheld by perfect worker mobility; the wage disparities in Panels C and D arise 
because of mobility frictions.  
A final important message of the toy model Figure 1 is that it reiterates a key message of Rupert 
and Wasmer’s paper—that frictions to mobility interact with institutions (e.g. unemployment 
benefits  ) to determine equilibrium unemployment. However, in this simple model of spatial 
arbitrage this interaction arises for precisely the opposite reason emphasized in the authors’ 
model—it is because space is not isotropic. Unemployment arises because workers in location 1 
would like to move to location 2 if it weren’t for the mobility friction. 
Of course, this does not imply that the model Rupert and Wasmer explore is not empirically 
relevant. Rather, it seems that the two models capture different dimensions of worker mobility. 
The model in Figure 1 is evocative of the steel worker in a declining steel town deciding on 
whether to move to a more promising location. In contrast, Rupert and Wasmer’s model evokes 
the decisions of a worker in an urban labor market trying to move closer to the location of her 
job. Both seem worthy of further thought. 
My final comments relate to the calibration strategy that Rupert and Wasmer pursue. Mobility 
frictions in their model are shaped by two parameters: the cost of commuting  , and the arrival 
rate of housing offers   . The paper suggests that differences in these two parameters can 
explain differences in unemployment and mobility between the United States and Europe. 
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I would argue that these results should be taken as more suggestive than conclusive. Specifically, 
the paper sets the cost of commuting to be fifty percent higher in Europe than in the United 
States. It is not entirely clear how the authors arrive at this number. Reference is made to the 
undeniably higher cost of gasoline in Europe, a difference which the authors shade down based 
on higher fuel efficiency in Europe. But, how exactly this implies a fifty-percent difference in   
is somewhat mysterious.  
Similarly, the paper sets the mobility friction to be approximately twice the size in Europe. The 
authors admit that this is precisely the difference that allows that model to replicate the European 
mobility rate. The unfortunate implication of this is that it is hard to calibrate    except by 
targeting the moment we wish to explain. 
On further reflection, it seems to me that it is simply very difficult to calibrate the model. In 
reality, gasoline prices and fuel efficiency cannot be expected to account for the entirety of the 
costs of commuting, or of the differences in those costs across countries. Leading estimates of 
the costs of migration in the United States suggest that these costs are substantial. For example, 
Kennan and Walker (2011) obtain estimates of moving costs on the order of $300,000. These 
estimates seem so substantial as to be not entirely pecuniary. In this sense, it would be surprising 
if differences in mobility rates could be attributed to strictly pecuniary items like gasoline prices. 
Obtaining a plausible calibration of the non-pecuniary costs of moving across countries would 
seem to be a formidable problem. 
To summarize, I think the interaction of mobility frictions with unemployment determination is 
an excellent question on which more work needs to be done. Rupert and Wasmer’s take on this 
question—that workers are engaged in a search problem over locations—is a novel one. The 
model that emerges from their analysis displays the virtues of tractability and parsimony.  
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My reactions to the paper are threefold. First, the authors’ assumption of isotropy is a strong one 
that seems at the root of the effect of mobility frictions on unemployment in their model. Second, 
the model abstracts from the notion that mobility acts as a form of spatial arbitrage, and as a 
result misses some interesting interactions between mobility costs and the determination of 
employment and wages. Finally, I think the calibration of the model should be taken as 
suggestive of the workings of the model, rather than as a fully-fledged quantitative exercise. 
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Figure 1. A toy model of mobility as spatial arbitrage 
A. Equilibrium with no frictions B. Reallocational shock with no frictions 
      
C. Reallocational shock with (infinite) mobility friction D. Shock with mobility friction and unemployment benefit 
  
 
